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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal observers predict that in President Obama’s second 
term, the Department of Labor (DOL) will tackle more cases 
concerning employee misclassification and overtime errors.1 What 
are the practical effects of such rulings on long-established 
employment practices?  This note attempts to examine this question 
in a particular area of employment law, namely the defining of 
exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).  
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,2 decided by the Supreme 
Court in the 2011–2012 session, settled a simple question that 
divided the Second and Ninth Circuits and vexed those in the 
pharmaceutical industry.3 Should companies like GlaxoSmithKline
*Hsuan Li is a 3L at Pepperdine University School of Law.  Her interests 
in law include employment law, corporate law, and civil rights.
1 See Jonathan R. Nadler & Joel S. Barras, If Obama Wins, Corporate 
America Should Brace for Crackdown on Use of Independent Contractors, FORBES
(Oct. 2, 2012, 2:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2012/10/02/if-
obama-wins-corporate-america-should-brace-for-crackdown-on-use-of-
independent-contractors (“[T]he [DOL] has made clear that it intends to effect 
sweeping changes.  Chief among them is a novel provision that could require 
companies to prepare a written ‘classification analysis’ for every worker . . . .  
[T]his requirement also could apply to employees who fall under one of the 
FLSA’s many exemptions covering categories such as professional, administrative, 
commissioned sales employees, and others.”); Pat Didomenico, Obama’s Second 
Term: What Does It Mean for Employers and HR?, The HR Soapbox, BUS. MGMT.
DAILY (Nov. 15, 2012, 4:50 PM), 
http://www.businessmanagementdaily.com/33846/obamas-second-term-what-does-
it-mean-for-employers-and-hr; DeWayne Pope, Obama’s Second Term: What Does 
It Mean for Employers and the Workplace? BIRMINGHAM BUS. L. BLOG (Nov. 8, 
2012), http://redmountainlawblog.com/2012/11/08/obamas-second-term-what-
does-it-mean-for-employers-and-the-workplace. 
In fact, the DOL’s Office of the Solicitor is encouraging plaintiffs to file 
“white collar” exemption cases through implementation of its Overtime Security 
Amicus Program.  See Overtime Security Amicus Program, DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/sol/541amicus.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
2 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
3 A simple misclassification ruling may have significant consequences for 
industries.  For instance, in this misclassification of employees as independent 
contractors, employers may have to pay billions of dollars more in payroll taxes, 
Social Security and Medicare taxes, and workers’ compensation taxes each year. 
Nadler & Barras, supra note 1.  Similarly, a reclassification of PSRs as nonexempt 
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Beecham (Glaxo) pay their pharmaceutical sales representatives 
(PSRs) overtime compensation under the mandate of FLSA, or are 
these PSRs excluded from protection under the “outside salesman” 
exemption?  The Court held 5–4 that PSRs are considered outside
salesmen exempt from FLSA overtime rules, and the DOL’s most 
recent interpretation of the relevant statute was not entitled to 
controlling deference.4 This ruling may be a tough pill to swallow 
for pharmaceutical sales representatives across the nation, as 
Christopher affirmed that they could not use FLSA to claim their 
overtime wages.
Or it may not be.  After all, PSRs were never compensated for 
overtime in the past.  The ruling merely validates and preserves that 
long-standing employment practice within the pharmaceutical sector.  
But a closer look at the ruling reveals greater implications that go 
beyond the prescription drug industry.  The massive quantitative 
effect that the decision has made upon the rights and interests of 
those in the pharmaceutical industry may spill into a wide range of 
industries and affect many types of employees, including mortgage 
loan officers.5 It is clear that the impact of this law is significant and 
worth careful consideration because of its widespread impact on not 
only the estimated 92,000 PSRs nationwide, but also the tens of 
thousands of employees from diverse industries who lie within the 
scope of or at the periphery of FLSA.
Another key feature of this opinion is that it provides an 
informative example of the Court’s position in relationship to 
governmental agencies of the executive branch within the realm of 
administrative law.  At the heart of the decision are the conflicting 
from FLSA could cost the industry billions of dollars in revenue to pay these 
employees overtime.
4 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2164–65.
5 Daniel Fisher, Supreme Court Rejects Labor Dept. View on Sales-Rep 
Overtime, FORBES (Jun. 18, 2012, 11:24 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/06/18/supreme-court-rejects-labor-
dept-view-on-sales-rep-overtime (“[T]oday’s decision should help overturn the 
decision of a federal court in Washington D.C. that approved of the Labor Dept.’s 
2010 switch in policy toward counting mortgage loan officers as non-exempt.  The 
ruling could potentially affect 250,000 employees and cost the financial industry 
billions of dollars in back pay.”); see also Wong v. HSBC Mortg. Corp. (USA), 
No. C-07-2446 MMC, 2009 WL 151014 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2009) (denying motion 
for class certification of mortgage loan officers claiming they were not exempt 
under both FLSA and the state “outside sales” exemption).
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interpretations of what FLSA’s outside salesman exemption and 
relevant regulations cover. On one side, the pharmaceutical 
companies sought to exclude PSRs from qualifying for overtime pay 
under FLSA by defining their work as “making sales,” and 
categorizing them as outside salesmen.6 On the other side, the DOL 
and the Obama administration argued that FLSA was designed to 
protect workers from exploitation and excessive hours, and thus 
PSRs should not qualify for the outside salesman exemption.7 Under 
the Court’s authority in the province of administrative law, the Court 
gave the ultimate interpretation of the exemption in the context of 
PSRs.  Parts II and III of this note will explain the case in depth and 
show how both sides were able to make these conflicting arguments, 
both of which were rooted in administrative law and FLSA history 
and practice.  Part III will go into particular detail on how this 
interesting interaction resulted in a decision that penalized the DOL 
for its failure to “police” the long-standing pharmaceutical industry 
practice of placing PSRs within the outside salesman exemption,8 and 
how it saved the pharmaceutical industry from spending perhaps 
additional millions of dollars annually9—plainly demonstrating what 
is at stake in the battles between the agencies and the courts in the 
administrative law arena.
In Part IV, this note will examine how the Court came to its 
decision.  The role of the DOL and other executive agencies may be 
summarized under two themes: “(1) the agency is charged with the 
detail of regulation and (2) the agency is expected to develop 
6 See infra Part II.C.
7 Id.
8 See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2168.
9 See generally IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 2010), 
vacated, IMS Health, Inc. v. Schneider, 131 S. Ct. 3091 (2011), and abrogated by
Sorel v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (“[P]harmaceutical manufacturers 
. . . spend billions of dollars a year to have some 90,000 pharmaceutical sales 
representatives make weekly or monthly one-on-one visits to prescribers 
nationwide”).  The global industry is estimated to make total sales of $820 billion 
each year.  Steven I. Locke, The Fair Labor Standards Act Exemptions and the 
Pharmaceuticals Industry: Are Sales Representatives Entitled to Overtime?, 13 
BARRY L. REV. 1, 1 (2009). As many as 100,000 pharmaceutical sales 
representatives visit physicians nationwide and distribute between $4 billion and 
$14 billion dollars in promotional spending.  Id.
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expertise in a particular area of regulation.”10 For governmental 
agencies such as the DOL, this means they are charged with the
interpretation of the laws passed by Congress and with promulgating 
additional rules and regulations where Congress has granted them 
authority to do so. 11 This article examines the interpretation 
dimension as well as the latter rulemaking aspect and its interplay 
with judicial review. Christopher presented a situation where 
Congress deferred the interpretation of the relevant laws (FLSA) to 
the controlling agency, the DOL.  Yet the Court rejected the DOL’s 
interpretation of FLSA.  In other words, the agency’s reading of its 
own regulations was rejected.
Finally, Part V of this note will analyze the impact of the 
ruling in view of the existing laws of individual states.  Who is 
impacted and how widespread is that impact?  What is the 
significance of the ruling?  This note goes deeper to investigate 
whether these predictions are likely to be realized in view of the 
existing rules in individual states.  Have PSRs effectively lost all 
hope in obtaining overtime compensation in every state?  This is a 
question that shows the interesting coexistence of and interplay 
between federal and state administrative law.  Part V will discuss 
particular states, and provide a general idea of how PSRs who wish 
to obtain overtime compensation will fare under state law in the 
aftermath of Christopher.  In Part VI, I will briefly conclude and 
offer predictions on where the industry and the PSRs will go from 
here.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-FLSA: The Undefined “White-Collar” Exemption
29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) explicitly excludes “any employee 
employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional 
capacity . . . or in the capacity of outside salesman” from FLSA 
10 WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6 (6th 
ed. 2012).
11 See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s 
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) (explaining that pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), gaps and
ambiguities in statutes are construed as Congress’s “implied delegation of 
authority” to agencies). 
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protections.12 These are known as the “white-collar” exemptions.13
These FLSA exemptions trace their lineage down from a line of 
antecedents that included the pre-Depression wage and hour 
legislation that applied only to “laborers, workmen, and 
mechanics,”14 and the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),15
which saw the first express proposal for an executive, administrative, 
and supervisory exemption. 16 While a class line was drawn to 
distinguish upper-level workers, it was unclear which jobs were 
12 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012).
13 Yuen v. U.S. Asia Commercial Dev. Corp., 974 F. Supp. 515, 519 (E.D. 
Va. 1997).
14 Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-
Drawing in New Deal Hours Legislation, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2212, 2223 (1998).
Professor Malamud offers many possible reasons for why white-collar workers 
were not covered by the pre-New Deal worker protection laws.  The main reason 
was that the legislation was health-oriented, and white-collar workers did not work 
in conditions that were “as injurious to health as those of industrial workers.”  Id. at 
2223–24.  Further, white-collar workers were not unionized, as the unskilled 
industrial workers were.  Id. at 2224.  Finally, Professor Malamud posits that 
perhaps the white-collar workers did not welcome these regulations because they 
were interested in—and had an opportunity for—professional advancement; not 
only did they need the long working hours, they also needed to maintain their 
social status, and siding with the bosses rather than the manual workers would be 
more in the interest of the white-collar workers.  Id.
15 Enacted on June 16, 1933, the purpose of NIRA was “work-spreading,”
because President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration viewed raising wages and 
shortening work hours as a means of mitigating the nation’s unemployment 
dilemma.  Id. at 2253 n.156; see also Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum Wage, DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/flsa1938.htm#2 (last visited Feb. 5, 
2013) (explaining that while the bill was in Congress, proponents argued that 
“unnecessarily long hours . . . wear out part of the working population while they 
keep the rest from having work to do.”  They were confident that shortening hours 
would create millions of new jobs for the unskilled.)  Like its successor FLSA, 
NIRA provided maximum hours and minimum wage regulations.  Unlike FLSA, 
however, NIRA did not “specify the permissible wages and hours of labor,” but 
only required that all industries form their own codes of fair competition and 
comply with the agreed hours and wages regulations.  Malamud, supra note 14, at 
2253–54.  NIRA was found unconstitutional in 1935.  See infra note 22.
16 Malamud, supra note 14, at 2236.  By the end of the two years that 
NIRA was able to guide the formation of worker-friendly industry codes, there was 
a “measure of consistency in excluding certain upper-level employees” from 
overtime and minimum wage provisions, but there was no articulation or agreement 
on where the lines should be drawn between protected and non-protected 
employees.  Id. at 2281–82.
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considered “white-collar” and which were not. 17 The proper 
boundaries of the exemptions were a subject of debate to those in the 
industry and even to those within the government administration who 
formulated the proposed regulations. 18 Yet the term was never 
clearly defined.19 President Roosevelt promised the public that he 
would protect the “white-collar class as well as the men in 
overalls,” 20 but he never clarified the scope of the classification 
either. 21 While NIRA was shot down within two years of its 
promulgation—when the Supreme Court of the United States 
declared NIRA unconstitutional on “Black Monday,” May 27, 
1935 22 —the vaguely-defined white-collar exemption survived and 
expanded its exclusions to include the category of outside salesman.23
17 As Professor Malamud points out, sociologists have identified that the 
difficulty in distinguishing classes lies in the phenomenon of the “twilight belt in 
which some members of the two groups overlap and merge.”  Malamud, supra note 
14, at 2227.  This was true in studies that dichotomized a community into a 
“working class” and a “business class.”  Id. The distinction has become even 
fuzzier with the creation of a “new middle class” that included “[c]ivil servants, 
clerks, and clerical workers.”  Id. at 2228.
18 The first director of NIRA’s Division of Research and Planning, 
Alexander Sachs, expressly exempted executive, administrative, and supervisory 
positions from his pre-NIRA memorandum concerning his proposed wage and hour 
guidelines for NIRA.  Id. at 2236.
19 Sachs’s memorandum did not specify where he drew the class lines, it 
“simply [took] the need for an exemption and the location of the boundary line 
between regulated and exempt workers for granted.”  Id. at 2237.  See generally id.
at 2212 (discussing the blurring of class lines and the failure to define the white-
collar class).
20 Id. at 2254; see also Grossman, supra note 15.
21 Alba Edwards, long-term director of the Census Bureau, actually 
excluded “manager, officials, and professional persons” from his definition of the 
white-collar classification.  Malamud, supra note 14, at 2254 (internal quotations 
omitted).
22 In Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), 
slaughterhouse operators tested the constitutionality of NIRA by challenging the 
“Live Poultry Code” promulgated under section 3 of the Act.  Id. at 521.  The code 
sought to regulate the live poultry industry in and around New York City.  Id. at 
523.  The Court unanimously found that the code resulted from an unconstitutional 
“delegation of legislative power.”  Id. at 542, 551. This ruling invalidated not only 
the live poultry provisions, but also the progressive labor standards of NIRA 
completely.  Grossman, supra note 15.
Despite the major setback of the Schechter decision, the progressive labor 
movement would sweep across the nation again starting on “White Monday,” 
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B. FLSA’s “Outside Employee Exemption”
After President Roosevelt’s reelection in 1936, which he saw 
as the public’s support for the New Deal,24 his administration took up 
the task of replacing NIRA with a new fair labor standards regulation 
that would protect workers from “substandard wages and oppressive 
working hours.”25 After a year-long battle in the House,26 FLSA 
came to fruition on June 24, 1938, and became effective on October 
24 of the same year.  The new Act required employers to pay 
employees at least the federal minimum wage and to compensate 
employees one and one-half times their regular wage for hours 
worked in excess of forty hours per week.27 However, as was true 
for NIRA, Congress did not intend to protect all employees under this 
statute.  Under § 213(a)(1), the statute exempted white-collar 
employees, which include certain executive, administrative, 
professional, and outside sales employees. 28 The Roosevelt 
administration hoped to alleviate the crisis of widespread 
unemployment by implementing this measure.29 While legislative 
history on the exemptions is scarce, the Wage and Hour Division of 
the DOL suggests that Congress excluded these classes based on the 
premise that these workers earned much higher salaries than blue 
collar minimum wage workers and “enjoy[ed] other compensatory 
March 29, 1937.  Grossman, supra note 15.  On this date, the Supreme Court 
upheld the Washington minimum wage law in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.
300 U.S. 379 (1937) (the Court ruled in favor of a hotel chambermaid, allowing her 
to recover the difference between the state minimum wage and the wages paid to 
her).  Roosevelt had been reelected by a landslide in 1936, which he understood as 
a validation of his New Deal policies, and he pressured the Court into ruling for the 
employee by an ultimatum that threatened to diminish the authority of the Court by 
adding six justices to the bench.  Grossman, supra note 15.
23 See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012).
24 He won by a landslide, winning by a count of 523 electoral votes to 8.  
Grossman, supra note 15.
25 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2162 
(2012) (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 
(1981)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 202(a).
26 For an interesting discussion of Roosevelt’s fair standards campaign in 
the halls of Congress, see Grossman, supra note 15.
27 See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). 
28 § 213(a)(1). 
29 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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privileges” and “better opportunities for advancement,” rendering 
wage protection unnecessary. 30 Further, these workers enjoyed a 
relatively low degree of employer supervision, and the work they 
performed was “difficult to standardize to any time frame,” making it 
difficult to implement the overtime provisions.31
The outside salesman exemption appeared in the categories of 
exclusions and expressly authorized the Secretary of Labor to 
promulgate rules “from time to time” and granted it the power to 
“define and delimit the specific terms of [the] exemptions through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.” 32 Ultimately, this task was 
designated to the DOL’s newly created Wage and Hour Division.33
The Division promulgated specific rules for the outside salesman 
exemption in 29 C.F.R. § 541.500, as follows:34
(a) The term “employee employed in the capacity of 
outside salesman” in section 13(a)(1) of the Act shall 
mean any employee:
(1) Whose primary duty35 is:
30 Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, 
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 
22,122–24 (Apr. 24, 2004) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541) [hereinafter Final 
Rule].
31 Id.  For reasoning that mirrors the Wage and Hour Division’s language, 
see Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 398 (9th Cir. 2011), 
aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (quoting Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, 118 F.2d 202, 
207–08 (10th Cir. 1941) (“There are no restrictions respecting the time he shall 
work and he can earn as much or as little, within the range of his ability, as his 
ambition dictates.  In lieu of overtime, he ordinarily receives commissions as extra 
compensation.  He works away from his employer's place of business, is not 
subject to the personal supervision of his employer, and his employer has no way 
of knowing the number of hours he works per day.”).
32 Final Rule, supra note 30, at 22124; 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
33 Malamud, supra note 14, at 2289.
34 29 C.F.R. § 541.500 (2013). Although the regulations were reissued in 
1938, 1940, 1949, and finally in 2004, the “current regulations are nearly identical 
in substance to the regulations issued in the years immediately following the 
FLSA’s enactment.”  Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2162.
35 “‘Primary duty’ means the principal, main, major, or most important 
duty that the employee performs.”  29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a).  The Wage and Hour 
Division’s 2004 Final Rule reaffirmed its “primary duty” test as the means to 
determine whether an employee was to be classified as an outside salesman.  Final 
Rule, supra note 30, at 22,128.  The Final Rule was supported by the Wage and 
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(i) making sales within the meaning of section 
3(k) of the Act,36 or
(ii) obtaining orders or contracts for services or 
for the use of facilities for which a 
consideration will be paid by the client or 
customer; and
(2) Who is customarily and regularly engaged away 
from the employer's place or places of business in 
performing such primary duty. 
Section 541.500 is the general regulation, while § 541.501(b) 
attempts to clarify what      § 541.500(a)(1)(i) means by “sales within 
the meaning of section (k) of the Act.”  Unfortunately, the regulation 
merely restates the statutory definition of sale, with slight 
clarification denoted by the word “include”:
Sales within the meaning of section 3(k) of the Act 
include the transfer of title to tangible property, and in 
certain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of
intangible property.  Section 3(k) of the Act states that 
“sale” or “sell” includes any sale, exchange, contract 
to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or 
other disposition.37
The final relevant DOL regulation is § 541.503, which defines what 
type of “promotion work” is exempt and what is not.  This is a 
question that is also integral to the issue of whether an employee is 
an outside salesman because under the predominant “primary duty” 
Hour Division, with the reasoning that the test “is relatively simple, understandable 
and eliminates much of the confusion and uncertainty that are present under the 
existing rule” (referring to the twenty percent tolerance test, which disqualified a 
worker who spent more than twenty percent of his or her work hours on nonexempt 
duties, from the exemption).  Id. at 22,161.  The primary duties test avoided the 
difficult problem of keeping track of the work hours of the outside sales employee, 
which was consistent with the rationale behind the establishment of the white-
collar exemptions.  Id. at 22,128.
36 At the center of the dispute in Christopher was the scope of the word 
“sale” as defined by FLSA: “‘Sale’ or ‘sell’ includes any sale, exchange, contract 
to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.”  29 U.S.C. § 
203(k); see also Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2162.
37 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (emphasis added).
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test, if one of the employee’s primary duties is nonexempt 
promotional work, then he cannot be considered an outside salesman.  
On the flip side, if the work is exempt, he must be considered an 
outside salesman for FLSA purposes.  The text of § 541.503 reads as 
follows: 
“Promotion work that is actually performed incidental to and 
in conjunction with an employee’s own outside sales or 
solicitations is exempt work.  On the other hand, promotional 
work that is incidental to sales made, or to be made, by 
someone else is not exempt outside sales work.”38
C. Do Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives Actually Make 
“Sales?”
The PSR is not a salesperson in the traditional sense, but 
shares many of the characteristics of a traditional salesperson.  
Conventionally known in the pharmaceutical industry as “detail men” 
or “detailers,” PSRs provide information to physicians with the goal 
of selling pharmaceutical products produced by the drug 
manufacturers they represent.39 Although the law prohibits PSRs 
from making actual sales, 40 their job is to induce physicians to 
prescribe their products to patients, who will ultimately consummate 
the final sale of the products in a pharmacy.41 The success of a PSR 
38 Id. § 541.503(a).  The regulation goes on to give some examples of what 
promotional work may be.  For instance, a “company representative . . . visits chain 
stores, arranges the merchandise on shelves, replenishes stock by replacing old 
with new merchandise, sets up displays and consults with the store manager when 
inventory runs low, but does not obtain a commitment for additional purchases.”  
Id. § 541.503(c).  These duties are “not exempt work unless they are incidental to 
and in conjunction with the employee's own outside sales.”  Id. Because arranging 
merchandise and replenishing stock do not consummate a sale that a person himself 
makes, the work cannot be considered exempt as outside sales work.  Id.
39 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 387 (9th Cir. 
2011).
40 Christopher v. SmithKlein Beecham Corp., No. CV-08-1498-PHX-
FJM, 2009 WL 4051075, at *3–5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2009), aff’d sub nom., 635 
F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
41 “While it is not possible to directly link a PSR's marketing activities to a 
particular patient filling a prescription, the incentive compensation is based, in part, 
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undoubtedly depends on their marketing abilities; they undergo 
extensive training in sales techniques provided by the drug 
manufacturer, and they penetrate clinics and hospitals fully armed 
with company sales materials and sample products to distribute to 
physicians.42 However, whether the primary duties of a PSR could 
actually be defined as “sales” has been disputed by PSRs and their 
employers.
If PSRs in fact make sales, then their employers can legally 
classify them as exempt outside salesmen who are not entitled to 
overtime compensation under FLSA.43 Unfortunately, when drafting 
FLSA, Congress did not abide by the schoolhouse rule to refrain 
from circular definitions.  Instead, the statute defines “sale” as 
“include[ing] any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for 
sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.” 44 The Secretary’s 
definitions do not bring clarity to this issue either.  As the district 
court in Christopher pointed out, “The regulations only marginally 
expound upon the statutory definition” and do not meaningfully offer 
any insight on whether the primary duties of a PSR include “making 
sales.”45 Specifically, 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) provides that sale in § 
on the number of prescriptions written by physicians in a PSR's assigned 
geographic area.”  Id. at *3 (internal citation omitted).
42 Glaxo trains PSRs on different methods to use to complete a call:
When Plaintiffs were hired, they received training in Glaxo's 
“Assertive Selling Always Professional (ASAP)” model.  They 
were also trained to follow Glaxo's “Winning Practices” 
program.  ASAP and Winning Practices are similarly structured 
and emphasize that a PSR should: (1) analyze and understand 
what is happening in an assigned region; (2) work with the team 
to drive results; (3) master professional knowledge to understand 
clinical management of patients; (4) prepare for calls; (5) “Sell 
Through Customer–Focused Dialogue”; (6) obtain the strongest 
commitment possible from a healthcare professional at the end of 
the call; and (7) provide added value to the customer relationship.
Christopher, 635 F.3d at 386–87.
43 Christopher v. SmithKlein Beecham Corp., No. CV-08-1498-PHX-FJM, 
2010 WL 396300 at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 1, 2010), aff’d sub nom., 635 F.3d 383 (9th 
Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (Cases involving these issues and PSRs 
“turn[] on the definition of ‘sale’ under FLSA.”).
44 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (2012).
45 Christopher, 2010 WL 396300, at *1.  Additionally, the court added: 
“Plaintiffs’ reference to regulations that define ‘promotion work’ and ‘primary 
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203(k) “include[s] the transfer of title to tangible property, and in 
certain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of intangible 
property.” 46 Pharmaceutical companies argue that courts should 
apply a broad meaning of sales and find that the promotional work 
that PSRs do to help consummate a future sale constitutes exempt 
sales work.47 The DOL and the PSRs, on the other hand, believe the 
court should adopt a strict construction that limits sale to an actual 
transaction in some sense. 48 In other words, they believe PSRs 
should personally receive orders that yield from their promotional 
efforts to be considered making sales.
This was the very issue that split the Second and Ninth 
Circuits and led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in 
Christopher.49 The Second Circuit grappled with the question in In 
re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation.50 In re Novartis was a class 
action brought by 2,500 PSRs who were employed by the drug 
manufacturer Novartis in California and New York.51 They alleged 
that they were entitled to overtime pay under FLSA and state law.52
The DOL filed an amicus brief supporting the plaintiff-PSRs, arguing 
that, “the fact that the Reps do not actually ‘make sales’ conclusively 
demonstrates that the position is not that of an outside salesperson 
consistent with the Department’s legislative rules.”53 The court ruled 
duty’ do not serve to define or delimit the definition of ‘sale,’ and therefore do not 
advance their position.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
46 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (2013).
47 See Brief for Respondent, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (No. 11-204), 2012 WL 957501 at *27–28.
48 Bryan D. Sullivan, Note, Reconciling the Terms and Spirit of the Law: 
Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives and the FLSA Outside-Sales Exemption, 96 
IOWA L. REV. 1429, 1437–44 (2011).
49 132 S. Ct. at 2165 (“We grant certiorari to resolve this split.”).  A Third 
Circuit case, Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2010), was 
ultimately decided on the “administrative employee” exemption rather than the 
“outside salesman” exemption.  The court found that PSRs were excluded under 
the former exemption.  Id. at 286.
50 In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), 
abrogated by Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
51 In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 144.
52 Id.
53 Brief for Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants, In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 
09-0437), 2009 WL 3405861. 
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that PSRs did not fall within FLSA’s outside salesman exemption 
because the requirement should be “narrowly construed against the 
employers . . . and their application limited to those establishments 
‘plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.’” 54 The 
court referred to two sources: first, 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b), in which 
the Secretary of Labor defined § 3(k) of the Act (which defines sales) 
to require the “transfer of title”;55 and second, the DOL’s definition 
of sale promulgated in the 2004 Final Rule, requiring a sale to at least 
include “a commitment to buy.”56 The court reasoned that the type 
of “commitment” the PSRs obtain from physicians does not 
constitute a commitment to buy or prescribe; the promises they 
obtain are too uncertain and remote to satisfy the “transfer of title” 
requirement.57
The Ninth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., the predecessor to the 
Supreme Court case in discussion.58 The Secretary of Labor once 
again filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioner-PSRs.  The 
DOL’s brief pointed out that the primary duty of the PSRs is “at most 
obtain[ing] from physicians a non-binding commitment to prescribe 
GSK drugs to their patients when appropriate,” and argued that the 
work should be characterized as nonexempt promotion work. 59
Promotion work can be exempt or nonexempt, according to the 
definition stated under 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(a). Using the language 
of the statute, the DOL explained that the type of promotional work 
that PSRs do “is incidental to sales made, or to be made, by someone 
else,” and thus qualifies as nonexempt work under the rules.60 The 
54 In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 150 (emphasis added).
55 Id. at 151.
56 Id. at 154; see also Final Rule, supra note 30.
57 In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 154.  The court declined to expand the 
concept of sales to include what Novartis called promotional activities, remarking 
that the pharmaceuticals industry should “direct its efforts to Congress, not the 
courts.”  Id. at 155.
58 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 
2011), aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
59 Brief for the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 
2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (No. 15257), 2010 WL 5854250, at *9–10.
60 Id. at *10.  The brief also quoted 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(b): “In other 
words, ‘Promotion activities directed toward consummation of the employee's own 
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court held that the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of FLSA’s 
definition of sale was not entitled to deference and that the PSRs fell 
within scope of the outside salesman exemption to FLSA’s overtime 
requirement.61 First, the court wrote that the Secretary’s definition, 
forwarded in the amicus brief, failed to clarify sale, but instead 
“parroted” the existing statutory language that purported to define 
sales. 62 Such an adoption would undermine “the Administrative 
Procedures Act and notice-and-comment rulemaking.”63 Thus, the 
court refused to apply Auer deference to the DOL’s definition.64
Even if Auer applied, the court wrote, “[T]he Secretary’s position is 
both plainly erroneous and inconsistent with her own regulations and 
practices” and should not be given controlling deference. 65
Determining whether this is a fair statement is as convoluted a 
process as the history of the dispute itself.  On one hand, the DOL 
has resisted—for fifty-five years—to extend the definition of sales to 
promotion work that is not done for the purpose of consummating the 
employee’s own sales.66 This was done in spite of pressure from 
sales are exempt. Promotional activities designed to stimulate sales that will be 
made by someone else are not exempt outside sales work.’” Id.
61 Christopher, 635 F.3d at 392, 401.
62 Id. at 394–95.  As in Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), because 
the agency merely “parroted” the statute rather than employing its expertise to 
clarify the ambiguous statute, the Court denied the agency Auer deference.
Christopher, 635 F.3d at 395.
63 Christopher, 635 F.3d at 395; see also 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012) 
(expressly giving the  Secretary the authority to define and delimit the exemptions 
through “notice-and-comment rulemaking”). 
64 “Were we to accept the Secretary’s offer, and give controlling deference 
even where there exists no meaningful regulatory language to interpret, we would 
unduly expand Auer's applicability to interpretations of statutes expressed for the 
first time in case-by-case amicus filings.”  Christopher, 635 F.3d at 395; see supra
note 105–106 and accompanying text. 
65 Id. at 395.  It is unclear how the Secretary’s position is “inconsistent 
with her own regulations and practices,” for it is noted that for fifty-five years, in 
spite of input from commenters such as the United States Chamber of Commerce, 
the DOL has refused to extend the definition of sales to promotional work that is 
not done for the purpose of consummating the employee’s own sales.  See Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, Christopher v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (No. 11-204), 2012 WL 
379584 [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
66 See Brief for the United States, supra note 65, at 3.
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commenters such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.67 On the other 
hand, the Ninth Circuit in Christopher pointed out that the DOL “did 
not challenge the conventional wisdom that detailing is the functional 
equivalent of selling pharmaceutical products,” until it spoke on 
behalf of the Petitioners in In re Novartis.68 In fact, in the DOL’s 
Dictionary of Occupation Titles, the definition for pharmaceutical 
detailers reads: “Promotes use of and sells ethical drugs and other 
pharmaceutical products to physicians . . . . Promotes and sells other 
drugs and medicines manufactured by company.  May sell and take 
order for pharmaceutical supply items from persons contacted.”69
In sum, the Ninth Circuit thought applying the DOL’s present 
interpretation of making sales would create an unjust result for 
Glaxo, which had reasonably relied on the seventy-some years of 
DOL acquiescence and industry assumption that PSRs were exempt 
employees.70 Whether this reasoning would carry the day was to be 
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on June 18, 2012.
III. FACTS
SmithKline Beecham Corporation d/b/a GlaxoSmithKline 
(Glaxo) is a pharmaceutical company that develops, markets, and 
sells pharmaceutical products worldwide.71 It follows the industry 
practice of dispensing its products to patients through a physician’s 
prescription, the only channel available by federal regulations.72
The petitioners were pharmaceutical sales representatives,
Michael Christopher and Frank Buchanan,73 who were employed by 
67 Id.
68 Christopher, 635 F.3d at 399.
69 DEP’T OF LABOR, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES § 262.157-
010 (4th ed. 1991).
70 Christopher, 635 F.3d at 400.
71 See About Us, What We Do, GLAXOSMITHKLINE,
http://www.gsk.com/about-us/what-we-do.html (last modified Aug. 6, 2013).
72 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2163 
(2012).
73 The petitioners originally sought to bring a class action at the district 
court level, but were denied certification by the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Arizona.  Christopher v. SmithKlein Beecham Corp., No. CV–08–1498–PHX–
FJM, 2009 WL 4051075, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2009).
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Glaxo for approximately four years beginning in 2003.74 Christopher 
and Buchanan were primarily “responsible for marketing and 
promoting [Glaxo’s] products to physicians” within their assigned 
territories, and with encouraging those physicians to prescribe 
Glaxo’s products to their patients.75 As was the situation with all the 
PSRs under Glaxo’s employment, Christopher and Buchanan were 
provided “with detailed reports on physicians, including their 
prescribing habits, their market share, and volume of prescriptions 
filled.”76 This detailed information was geared towards helping the 
PSRs develop a strategic sales plan that focused on targeting “the top 
250 physicians in their territory who prescribe for a particular disease 
state.” 77 As the majority stated in Christopher, their “primary 
objective was to obtain a nonbinding commitment from the physician 
to prescribe those drugs in appropriate cases, and the training that 
petitioners received underscored the importance of that objective.”78
The petitioners were essentially salesmen, hired for their sales 
experience, and trained to close each sales call by obtaining the 
maximum commitment possible from the physician.79 They received 
more than one month of training from Glaxo, which taught them 
about Glaxo products and instructed them on how to sell under the 
“Assertive Selling Always Professional (ASAP)” model and 
“Winning Practices” program.80 They worked away from the office, 
spending about “[forty] hours each week in the field calling on 
physicians,” and an additional ten to twenty hours per week 
performing miscellaneous tasks, including “attending events, 
reviewing product information, and returning phone calls.”81 They 
worked with minimal supervision and did not punch a clock or report 
their hours.82 On average each year Christopher earned over $72,000 
74 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2164.
75 Christopher, 2009 WL 4051075 at *1.  Glaxo “at one time maintained 
as many as 9,000 PSRs to promote their products.” Id.
76 Id. at *2.
77 Id.
78 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2164.
79 Id. at 2172–73.
80 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 386 (9th Cir. 
2011); see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
81 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2164.
82 Id.
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and Buchanan over $76,000, before taxes.83 Both sums accounted 
for each employee’s base salary and incentive pay, the latter of which 
“was based on the sales volume or market share of their assigned 
drugs in their assigned sales territories.”84 The incentive pay was 
uncapped; Christopher’s incentive pay accounted for over thirty 
percent of his gross pay annually, and Buchanan’s exceeded twenty-
five percent.85
However, neither was paid overtime compensation. 86
Christopher and Buchanan filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Arizona, alleging that Glaxo violated FLSA by failing to 
pay them time-and-a-half wages when they worked more than forty 
hours per week.87 Glaxo moved for summary judgment based on the 
§ 213(a)(1) “outside salesman” exemption and the district court 
granted summary judgment to the pharmaceutical company.88
The petitioners appealed the summary judgment and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, agreeing that the 
DOL’s interpretation was not entitled to controlling deference and 
that the PSRs were exempt employees.89 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on November 28, 2011.90
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
A. Justice Alito’s Majority Opinion
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, with Justice 
Breyer filing a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.  Justice Alito began his discussion by 
stating that the goal of the Court was to decide whether PSRs fit into 







89 Id. at 2159.
90 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 760 (mem.), 
granting cert. to 635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011).
91 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2161.
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introduced FLSA’s outside salesman exemption and explained that 
FLSA was passed with the purpose of “protect[ing] all covered 
workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours.”92
Establishing that Congress had not yet defined the term outside 
salesman, the Court proceeded to describe the instances of DOL’s 
exercise of its power to “defin[e] and delimit[t]” the term.93
The DOL promulgated the regulations in 1938, 1940, 1949, 
and in 2004,94 but “[t]he current regulations [were] nearly identical in 
substance to the regulations issued in the years immediately 
following FLSA’s enactment,” Justice Alito noted. 95 The Court 
identified three DOL regulations that were relevant to the 
determination of the case,96 but deemed them inconclusive and thus 
concluded that additional guidance from the DOL’s Wage and Hour 
Division reports made in connection with the 1940, 1949, and 2004 
regulation issuances would be helpful to determine the scope of the 
exemption.97
Justice Alito then proceeded to provide a factual overview of 
the case.  He focused on the pharmaceutical company’s position of 
having to limit its sales activities to “detailing”—providing 
information to physicians about company products to influence the 
products they prescribed to their patients in appropriate cases—the 
medical practitioners who were ultimately the people “who possess 
the authority to prescribe the drugs.”98 He further noted that detailing 
had been in practice since “at least the 1950s” and that “the industry 
ha[d] employed more than 90,000 detailers nationwide” in recent 
years.99 He also underlined the petitioners’ lack of supervision—they 
“were not required to punch a clock or report their hours, and they 
92 Id. at 2162 (alteration in original).  Directly or not, this emphasizes that 
outside salesmen are not considered workers suffering from “substandard wages 
and oppressive working hours.”  Id.
93 Id. (alteration in original).
94 The DOL followed notice-and-comment procedures in its 2004 
reissuance. Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 2162; see infra Part II.B for a closer look at the three regulations.
97 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2163.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 2163–64.
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were subject to only minimal supervision”—and described the efforts 
of the petitioners as “well compensated.”100
The opinion went on to detail the procedural history of the 
case.  Justice Alito highlighted certain points that framed the rest of 
the Court’s two-part inquiry of (1) whether the DOL’s interpretation 
of the regulations relevant to the outside salesman exemption should 
be applied, and (2) whether PSRs fit into the outside salesman 
exemption as defined by the DOL or the Court, if the latter found the 
DOL’s interpretation objectionable within the context of the law.101
The opinion first squarely noted that the DOL’s recent interpretation 
of the regulations was “announced in an uninvited amicus brief” filed 
in the Second Circuit. 102 Then it summarized a couple of key 
concerns that led the Ninth Circuit to find in favor of the respondent 
drug manufacturer.  First, the DOL had previously interpreted 
“making a sale” to require that the salesman “in some sense” sell, but 
the DOL had now, without warning, tightened its interpretation in 
light of In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation, Christopher, and 
other similar cases.103 Second, the DOL had for over seventy years 
“acquiesced” in the drug industry’s practice of claiming PSRs as 
exempt.104
1. Did Auer Deference Apply?
When courts review agency interpretation of statutes, judges 
reach for Auer v. Robbins as an analytical tool.105 Under Auer, if an 
100 Id. at 2164.
101 Id. at 2165, 2170.
102 Id. at 2165.  The “uninvited amicus brief” was filed in reaction to In re 
Novartis.  The argument was rejected and the motion denied by the district court.  
See supra notes 48–55 and accompanying text.
103 Final Rule, supra note 30. While the DOL described “a sale” as a 
“consummated transaction directly involving the employee for whom the 
exemption is sought” in the amicus briefs filed in the Second and Ninth Circuits, 
the Secretary now clarifies that a sale requires the employee to transfer title of the 
property at issue. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2166 (citing Brief for the United 
States, supra note 65, at 12–13).
104 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2165.
105 519 U.S. 452 (1997).  In Auer, police sergeants sued the St. Louis 
Board of Police Commissioners under FLSA for overtime wage benefits.  Id. at 
454.  The Court held that the Secretary of Labor reasonably interpreted the “bona 
fide executive, administrative, or professional” regulation as denying exempt status 
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agency interprets its own ambiguous regulation, the court will accord 
substantial deference to that agency definition.106 Even where an 
interpretation initially appears in a legal brief, such as where the 
DOL’s interpretation of “making a sale” was advanced in its amicus
brief to the Second Circuit, the interpretation may still be entitled to 
judicial deference.107 The watchword is may, as courts do not have to 
defer to agency interpretations if they are “plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation,” 108 or if the court makes the 
judgment that the agency did not fairly consider the matter under 
interpretation.109
Diving into the initial question of whether the Court should 
defer to the DOL’s interpretation, the Court took the position that the 
DOL “changed course” after the Court granted certiorari in 
Christopher, 110 and in doing so, “seriously undermine[d] the 
principle that agencies should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning 
of the conduct [a regulation] prohibits or requires.’” 111    Justice 
Alito’s reasoning is perhaps first and foremost outcome-oriented, as 
he stated that finding PSRs within the exemption would cause “unfair 
surprise” to the pharmaceutical industry, which has treated 
detailers/PSRs as outside salesmen for over seventy years.112 There 
was no “adequacy of notice” to the companies by way of statutes or 
regulations, nor was there ever any enforcement action that signaled 
to employees such as police sergeants.  Id. at 458.  Justice Scalia, on behalf of the 
unanimous Court, wrote: “A rule requiring the Secretary to construe his own 
regulations narrowly would make little sense, since he is free to write the 
regulations as broadly as he wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by the 
statute.”  Id. at 463.
106 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2166.
107 Id.
108 Id. (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461).
109 Id.; see also Stephen M. Johnson, Bringing Deference Back (But for 
How Long?): Justice Alito, Chevron, Auer, and Chenery in the Supreme Court's 
2006 Term, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2007), for a discussion of whether Auer has 
eroded under recent decisions, especially in the aftermath of Gonzales.  Here in 
Christopher, the Court again refused to accord judicial deference to agency 
interpretations; this could perhaps be viewed as an additional strike by the Roberts 
Court against Auer.
110 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2166.
111 Id. at 2167 (citing Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health 
Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)) (alteration in original).
112 Id.
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to the industry that it was misclassifying its 90,000 detailers/PSRs of 
recent years and of all others in decades past.113 The opinion stated: 
“[W]hile it may be ‘possible for an entire industry to be in violation 
of the [FLSA] for a long time without the Labor Department 
noticing,’ the ‘more plausible hypothesis’ is that the Department did 
not think the industry’s practice was unlawful.”114
Reinforcing the opinion’s legal reasoning in deciding not to 
afford Auer deference, Justice Alito stressed—a few years after 
Auer—the standard for deference that the Court set out in United 
States v. Mead Corp.115: deference to the Department will be given 
only to the extent of thoroughness and validity that the agency 
demonstrates through its pronouncements.116 If the reasons cited are 
not persuasive, then no deference is warranted.117 Here, not only did 
the Secretary fail to solicit public comment before advancing the 
interpretation, the reasoning that the DOL used to support its 
interpretation was not on solid footing.118 In fact, Justice Alito wrote, 
the DOL changed its interpretation following the Second Circuit’s 
rejection of it.119 Such a decision process was “untenable” and not a 
hallmark of the thorough consideration that as required for Auer 
deference, as qualified by Mead.120 Perhaps most damaging to the 
DOL’s interpretation, wrote Justice Alito, was that the new 
interpretation was “flatly inconsistent with the FLSA.”121 That is the 
case because the new interpretation required the passing of title in a 
sale, but the statute at issue included “consignment for sale” as part 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 2168 (alternation in original) (quoting Yi v. Sterling Collision 
Ctrs. Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 510–11 (7th Cir. 2007)).
115 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
116 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2168–69.  Sometimes Mead is cited to 
indicate that formal notice-and-comment procedures are a measure of whether an 
agency was thorough in its consideration of a given interpretation, but Mead 
emphasizes that taking an informal process “does not alone” bar judicial deference.  
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 219.
117 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2168–69.
118 Id. at 2169.
119 Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 103.
120 See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2169.
121 Id.
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of the sale definition.” 122 The DOL’s “argu[ment] that a 
‘consignment for sale’ may eventually result in the transfer of title” 
actually worked against the result that it sought to effect—the 
analogy could be extended to the present situation as well—for a 
physician’s nonbinding commitment may also eventually result in the 
transfer of title.123
The DOL’s readings of regulations that were used to support 
its interpretations were deemed defective as well, as the Court 
pointed out that the DOL intentionally read the sales regulation under 
29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b)124 to necessarily include the transfer of title, 
when the regulation did not actually require it.125 Furthermore, the 
DOL’s interpretation of promotional work was also forced and not 
really relevant or persuasive in determining the meaning of sales, 
because the regulation itself does not purport to distinguish between 
promotion work and sales, only between exempt and nonexempt 
promotion work.126
In its entirety, the opinion finds the DOL’s interpretation 
unpersuasive and refuses to apply Auer deference.
2. The Court’s Interpretation of “Sales”
Because Justice Alito refused to accord Auer deference to the 
DOL’s interpretation, he employed the traditional tools of 
interpretation and looked to the statute and regulations for clues.  The 
Court first examined the language of 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1), which 
excludes from protection, anyone “employed . . . in the capacity of 
[an] outside salesman.” 127 The Court found support for the 
proposition that perhaps FLSA’s notion of a salesman was not so 
rigid as to exclude anyone who does not fit the standard sense of the 
word: “The statute’s emphasis on the ‘capacity’ of the employee 
counsels in favor of a functional, rather than a formal, inquiry, one 
122 Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (2012).  “A ‘consignment for sale’ 
does not involve the transfer of title.”  Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2169.
123 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2169.
124 See 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (2013).
125 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2169.
126 Id. at 2170; see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b).
127 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2170 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)) 
(emphasis added).
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that views an employee’s responsibilities in the context of the 
particular industry in which the employee works.”128
The DOL’s interpretation also “makes clear that the examples 
enumerated in the text are intended to be illustrative, not 
exhaustive.” 129 29 C.F.R. § 541.501 clarifies that “sales” are 
activities that involve the transfer of title, but it also parrots the 
statute in emphasizing that the scope actually “includes any sale, 
exchange, . . . or other disposition.”130 Congress’s language (and the 
DOL’s reiteration of it) is significant because of the use of “include” 
and “any” as modifiers to sale, which means that Congress intended 
to include transactions that are not considered sales in a technical 
sense.131 If there is any doubt as to this expansive reading, the statute 
and regulation even contain a broad catchall phrase of “or other 
disposition.” 132 Thus, given the realities of the pharmaceutical 
industry, it would be “obscure and [would] defeat the intent and 
purpose of Congress” to exclude detailers from this definition.133
Obtaining a nonbinding commitment from a physician 
to prescribe one of respondent’s drugs is the most that 
petitioners were able to do to ensure the eventual 
disposition of the products that respondent sells.  This 
kind of arrangement, in the unique regulatory 
environment within which pharmaceutical companies 
must operate, comfortably falls within the catchall 
category of “other disposition.”134
With this working definition, the Court applied a “functional” 
and comparative analysis to the situation laid out in Christopher and 
drew the conclusion that PSRs “bear all of the external indicia of 
salesmen.”135 Not only were Christopher and Buchanan hired for 
their sales experience, they were trained to obtain the maximum 
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (emphasis added).
131 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2171.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 2172.
135 Id.
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commitment possible from physicians, with the end goal of 
“convinc[ing] physicians . . . to prescribe the drug in appropriate 
cases.”136 Moreover, their duties were nearly identical to exempt 
employees who, instead of selling over-the-counter drugs, “sell 
physician-administered drugs, . . . [which can be] ordered by the 
physician directly.”137
Finally, the Court justified its holding as consistent with the 
rationale for excluding certain employees from FLSA protections.  
Christopher and Buchanan each made more than $70,000 per year on 
average, as is common for all detailers in the industry, which would 
make them somewhat an anomaly in the category of FLSA-protected 
employees, who are typically minimum wage earners.138 Including 
them in the nonexempt class would also be contrary to FLSA’s goal 
of simplifying compliance with the statute by exempting employees 
who perform work that is “difficult to standardize to any time 
frame.”139 Indeed, employers could not easily keep track of when
PSRs like Christopher and Buchanan were performing their work in 
their respective assigned sales territories, or even how much time it 
took for them to accomplish their duties in the field.140
B. Justice Breyer’s Dissent
Justice Breyer wrote the dissenting opinion.  He agreed with 
the Court that Auer deference should not be applied.  However, 
despite using the same method of interpretation as the Court, he 
arrived at a different conclusion—namely, that PSRs should not be 
treated as exempt employees.141 At the heart of his dissent was the 
conviction that detailers do not really sell at all; that the “nonbinding 
commitments” that they obtain are not only flimsy assurances,142 but 
136 Id. at 2174.
137 Id. at 2173.
138 See id.; see also Final Rule, supra note 30, at 22,124.
139 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2173.
140 Id. at 2173; see supra Part III.
141 Christopher, 132 S. Ct at 2179 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142 What is a “nonbinding commitment” anyways, Justice Breyer asks 
rhetorically, and jeeringly juxtaposes the phrase with a series of colloquial 
oxymorons—a “definite maybe,” an “impossible solution,” or a “theoretical 
experience”—to make his point.  Id. at 2176–77.  The majority is probably still 
more correct in their view that a “nonbinding commitment” is more concrete than 
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“more naturally characterized as involving ‘promotional activities 
designed to stimulate sales made by someone else’”—i.e. nonexempt 
promotion work as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 541.503.143 The dissent 
reasoned that because both the drug manufacturers and the physicians 
acknowledged that physicians do not prescribe the specific drugs 
simply because the detailers inform them about it, the “promises” 
they obtain cannot be true promises to prescribe and thus can only be 
characterized as nonexempt promotion work performed for the 
purpose of helping the company obtain an order from the pharmacy 
later on.144 The dissent acknowledged that the main characteristics of 
a PSR’s job description mirror those occupations that are generally 
exempted from FLSA, 145 but nonetheless categorically rejected 
keeping PSRs within the exemption for reasons that do not fully 
contemplate the key purposes of FLSA and its exemptions,146 which 
are to protect non-salary workers and to exempt those who enjoy 
greater independence and limited supervision by their employers.147
V. IMPACT
This section explores how the Christopher ruling may affect 
the number of PSR misclassification cases in individual states.  
the dissent believes and more comparable to a sale than not.  After all, PSRs 
calculate their commission earnings based on these commitments; if these promises
to prescribe were not so concrete, would sophisticated pharmaceutical companies 
be willing to award their employees for extracting them?
Clearly the work of detailers lies in the gray area between “selling” and 
“not selling.”  Perhaps like almost everything else in this world, it is a political 
question that is colored by each individual’s social and political philosophy and 
answered accordingly.  That the majority and dissenters are divided along political 
lines seem to suggest that this suggestion might be true — i.e., the liberals took a 
more employee/PSR-favoring interpretation, and the conservative justices held 
steadfastly for the big pharmaceutical employers.
143 Id. at 2177; see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.503 (2013).
144 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2177–79.
145 The PSRs earn relatively high pay rather than minimum wage, work 
uncertain hours and frequently beyond regular work hours, and exercise a high 
degree of independence and freedom from supervision.  Id. at 2179.  These are all 
characteristics of the general FLSA exemptions for executive, administrative, and 
outside sales employees, and therefore they fall within the statutory provisions.  Id.
146 See Id. at 2179–80.
147 See supra text accompanying note 31 (discussing why some types of 
workers are exempt under the wage and hour laws).
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Christopher held that PSRs are considered outside sales employees 
under FLSA and are thus not protected by FLSA’s overtime 
compensation requirements.148 This does not necessarily mean that 
state overtime laws that include outside sales employees within its 
protections are preempted.149 Nor does this ruling preempt case law 
that defines PSRs as nonexempt employees under state overtime 
laws.  This leaves the possibility that PSRs may still sue 
pharmaceutical manufacturers on this issue based on applicable state 
law in states that recognize PSRs as nonexempt employees.  On the 
other hand, it is likely that most states adopt FLSA’s standards even 
for their own state overtime wages.  In those states, Christopher is 
the final word that precludes further litigation on the subject of 
overtime compensation for PSRs.  Finally, for states that do not have 
overtime requirements or states that have never considered PSRs as 
nonexempt to begin with, Christopher has no impact on the number 
of overtime cases involving PSRs.  Regardless, the effects may 
impact the rights and duties of employees in other industries.150
148 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2156 (majority opinion).
149 State laws that are stricter than federal law are not preempted by FLSA.  
Congress expressly provides in § 218 that the codified provisions of FLSA will not 
excuse noncompliance “with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance” that 
establishes a higher minimum wage or lower maximum workweek established by 
FLSA.  29 U.S.C. § 218 (2012); see also Henry H. Drummonds, Beyond the 
Employee Free Choice Act: Unleashing the States in Labor-Management Relations 
Policy, 19 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 114 (2009) (“State minimum wage 
laws preceded federal legislation by a quarter century” and Congress expressly 
provided for “non-preemption of more protective state enactments.”); Final Rule, 
supra note 30 at 22123 (“FLSA provides minimum standards that may be 
exceeded, but cannot be waived or reduced . . . and the Act does not preclude 
employers from entering into collective bargaining agreements providing wages 
higher than the statutory minimum, a shorter workweek than the statutory 
maximum, or a higher overtime premium.”).
150 For instance, see infra Part IV.A for a discussion of Ramirez v. 
Yosemite Water Co., 978 P.2d 2 (Cal. 1999), in which a bottled water route 
salesmen sued under the California labor statute for recovery of his overtime 
wages.
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WHETHER A PSR CAN BRING SUIT AGAINST A FORMER 
PHARMACEUTICAL EMPLOYER IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
CHRISTOPHER:
^Unless otherwise precluded under the “administrative employee exemption”
Moving beyond a theoretical discussion, this note will now 
examine the factual effects of Christopher through the examination 
of a handful of states with historically strong labor laws and 
protections.  Although pharmaceutical companies are chiefly located 
in only a handful of states,151 they are open to liability in every state 
they send their detailers into.152 The following is a state-by-state 
review of a handful of states with large pharmaceutical manufacturer 
presence, to give the reader an idea of whether Christopher directly 
151 Out of 1,008 pharmaceutical company headquarters, the states with the 
most pharmaceutical companies include California (133), New Jersey (99), New 
York (81), Texas (46), Florida (46), Illinois (41), Massachusetts (43), and 
Pennsylvania (33).  Together, these states account for over half the pharmaceutical 
companies registered in the United States.  Pharmaceutical Company Directory,
MEDILEXICON, http://www.medilexicon.com/pharmaceuticalcompanies.php (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2013).
152 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Office of Unemp’t Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 
310, 316, 318 (1945) (“Minimum contacts . . . because of their nature and quality 
and the circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the 
corporation liable to suit.”).
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impacted the right of PSRs in particular states to obtain overtime 
compensation.153
A. California
California has perhaps the most comprehensive set of labor 
and employment laws in the nation as promulgated under the 
California Labor Code. 154 The Code provides state overtime 
protection,155 but section 1171 of the Code expressly excludes “any 
individual employed as an outside salesman.”156 No reported case 
has expressly determined whether pharmaceutical salesmen are in 
this exempt category.  California’s key “overtime salesman” 
classification case is Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., in which the 
California Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a bottled
water route salesman was entitled to recover overtime wages under 
California law. 157 The California Supreme Court ultimately 
remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the 
bottled water employee was primarily selling a product or rendering a 
service.158 The reasoning in this case is key as guidance for future 
cases regarding the classification of “outsides salesmen.”  First, the 
court made the distinction between California’s standard (as defined 
by the State’s Industrial Welfare Commission, or IWC) and the 
federal standard (as defined by the Wage and Hour Division of the 
DOL).159 The former “takes a purely quantitative approach, focusing 
exclusively on whether the individual works more than half the 
153 As there is no readily available public data on the number of PSRs 
working within particular states, this article will discuss states with greater 
pharmaceutical manufacturer presence.  The premise is that these are more heavily-
populated states with more medical offices and a greater need for PSRs.  Secondly, 
because of the companies’ proximity, they probably have greater influence over the 
promulgation of labor laws in their respective home states.
154 See OGLETREE DEAKINS, CALIFORNIA WAGE AND HOUR PRACTICE 
GROUP, available at
http://www.ogletreedeakins.com/sites/default/files/uploads/practice-
areas/cawageandhourbrochurecurrent.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
155 CAL. LAB. CODE § 510 (West 2011).
156 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1171.
157 Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 978 P.2d 2 (Cal. 1999).
158 See id. at 14.
159 See id. at 7–13.
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working time . . . selling . . . or obtaining orders or contracts.”160
FLSA takes a more qualitative approach, requiring the court to 
analyze whether the employee’s primary duties are “the making of 
sales or the taking of orders.” 161 Second, unlike the federal 
regulations, California also does not differentiate between exempt 
and nonexempt promotion work. 162 The court noted that, “By 
choosing not to track the language of the federal exemption and 
instead adopting its own distinct definition of ‘outside salespersons,’ 
the IWC evidently intended to depart from federal law and to provide, 
at least in some cases, greater protection for employees.”163
Overall, pharmaceutical detailers have a fair shot in bringing 
suit against employers for recovery of overtime wages in California.  
Because California has not yet decided that pharmaceutical salesman 
are “outside salesmen” exempt from the protections of the state’s 
overtime statute, and because the state supreme court uses the 
progressive method of making the determination with a quantitative 
approach, it is still possible for pharmaceutical salesmen to challenge 
their employers in court, especially if they can show that over fifty 
percent of their time is not spent on making sales or taking orders.  
True, the PSRs in this state will still run into the difficulty, as the 
petitioners in Christopher faced, of convincing the courts that 
providing information about pharmaceutical products to physicians is 
not the virtual equivalent of “making sales,” but it is an argument that 
is still available for California PSRs to make.
B. New Jersey
The State of New Jersey provides an example of state labor 
law moving towards uniformity with FLSA.  It has a state overtime 
statute that excludes certain classes of employees, including those 
employed in an “outside sales capacity.”164 Prior to 2012, the state’s 
160 Id. at 10 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Wage Order 
No.7-80, which was superseded by CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11070 (1998) but 
retains the same definition of “outside salesperson”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
161 Id. at 9 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.505(a) (1998)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
162 Id. at 10.
163 Id. at 11.
164 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 12:56-7.1 (2013).
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approach to determining whether an employee was an “outside sales
person” exempt from the state overtime statute165 was a two-part test 
that required the court to go through both a qualitative and 
quantitative inquiry to determine whether an employee is considered 
an “outside sales person.”166 The qualitative part of the test mirrored 
FLSA’s “primary duty” analysis, 167 while the quantitative portion 
was an independent basis much like California’s.168 In New Jersey 
Department of Labor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 169 Pepsi-Cola Company 
alleged that its employees qualified for the “outside sales persons” 
exemption “because they had sales responsibilities, objectives, and 
training, and were paid in part on commission.” 170 The court 
165 Id.
166 N.J. Dep’t of Labor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., No. A-918-00T5, 2002 WL 
187400, *4–*5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 31, 2002) (quoting N.J. ADMIN.
CODE § 12:56-7.4).  The statute stated: 
(a) “Outside sales person” means any employee: 
1. Who is employed for the purpose of and who 
is customarily and regularly engaged away from his or her 
employer's place or places of business in: 
i. Making sales; or 
ii. Obtaining orders or contracts for 
services or for the use of facilities for which a consideration will 
be paid by the client or customer; and 
2. Whose hours of work of a nature other than 
that described in (a)1 above do not exceed 20 percent of hours 
worked in the workweek; provided, that work performed 
incidental to and in conjunction with the outside sales person's 
own personal sales or solicitations, including incidental deliveries 
and collection, shall be regarded as exempt work . . . .
Id.
167 See id.
168 See supra text accompany note 160.
169 No. A-918-00T5, 2002 WL 187400 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 31, 
2002).
170 Id. at *5.  Naturally, this is the typical argument that employers would 
like to make, and neglecting to do so would result in a significant loss of corporate 
profit.  In Pepsi, New Jersey’s Office of Wage and Hour Compliance determined 
that Pepsi-Cola Co. owed its customer representatives and bulk customer 
representatives $1,885,098.68 in overtime wages, not to mention a fine of 
$188,509.87 in administrative fees relating to the violation.  Id. at *2.  How many 
cans and bottles of Pepsi will the company need to sell to recoup such a loss?
Fall 2013 A Tough Pill to Swallow 799
completed an exhaustive analysis of the duties of the company’s 
customer representatives and bulk customer representatives (once 
united in a single category as “Route Salesmen”) and determined that: 
(1) although it was true that plaintiffs were part of the “Driving 
Force” marketing program,171 and (2) commission earned was based 
on the territory’s sales growth performance,172 they were not exempt 
“outside sales persons.”173 These facts were akin to Christopher and 
Buchanan’s participation in the “Winning Practices” program, and 
their ability to earn commission based on the performance of their 
respective sales territories,174 which meant that PSRs would probably 
pass the qualitative part of the test.  Thus, if PSRs were able to 
persuade the court that they did not spend more than twenty percent 
of their work hours engaging in promotional activities that qualify as 
“making sales,” they would likely have passed the quantitative part 
of New Jersey’s test as well.
However, in 2011, the New Jersey Department of Labor 
proposed striking its quantitative limitation on the performance of 
non-exempt work to achieve uniformity with FLSA.175 Pursuant to a 
notice-and-comment procedure, 176 Section 12:56-7.4 of the New 
Jersey Administrative Code was repealed and New Jersey no longer 
has a quantitative analysis for defining what encompasses “outside 
sales.”  It is uncertain whether Pepsi-Cola, Co. will still be helpful to 
PSRs seeking overtime compensation as the qualitative portion of the 
case analysis has not been impacted by the repeal of § 12:56-7.4.
Nonetheless, the state’s adoption of FLSA’s approach to defining 
“outside sales” suggests that New Jersey courts may be compelled to 
apply the quantitative analysis more closely to Christopher in the 
future.
171 Id. at *6.  The program focused on expanding sales through infiltration 
of large supermarket chains.  Id.
172 Id. at *8.
173 Id. at *1.
174 See supra Part III.
175 Suzanne K. Brown, New Jersey State Department of Labor Proposes 
Repeal of Existing Overtime Exemption Rules and Adoption of Federal Overtime 
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C. New York
New York has a state overtime statute that expressly excludes 
“outside salesmen” from its protection.177   There is no reported case 
law that probes the issue of whether a detailer is an “outside 
salesman,” nor does the statute contain language that explains what 
standard of measurement might be used to determine whether an 
employee is an outside salesman.178 PSRs appear to have an open 
playing field here.
D. Massachusetts
Massachusetts’s overtime statute contains a provision that 
excludes “any employee [working] . . . as an outside salesman.”179
There is no specific definition given for “outside salesman.”  
However, the state’s relevant regulatory code states that the general 
exclusions of “bona fide executive, or administrative or professional 
person . . . have the same meaning” as FLSA’s terms, and such an 
application is supported by case law.180 Although no case law has 
discussed whether PSRs are defined as “outside salesmen,”181 given 
the inclination of the Massachusetts courts to adopt federal standards 
177 See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 652 (McKinney 2010) (minimum and overtime wage 
requirements); Id. § 651 (definitions that designate the types of employees that are 
not included).
178 Typically, the only time “outside salesmen” are mentioned is in 
connection with workers’ compensation cases, in which the court only has to 
determine whether the salesperson was within “the course of his employment” 
when he was injured.  See Post v. Tenn. Prods. & Chem. Corp., 200 N.E.2d 213, 
213 (N.Y. 1964) (estate of chemical salesman suing for worker’s compensation); 
Freudenfeld v. Louis Stein & Co., 2 N.E.2d 688, 688 (N.Y. 1936) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (estate of fur manufacturer’s outside salesman suing for 
worker’s compensation).  This does not help with the PSR analysis.
179 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151, § 1A (West) (effective Nov. 26, 
2003).
180 455 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.02(3) (2013); see Cash v. Cycle Craft Co., 
482 F. Supp. 2d 133, 140 (D. Mass. 2007), aff'd, 508 F.3d 680 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(“The Massachusetts statute governing overtime pay is nearly identical to the 
FLSA.”).
181 In fact, no reported case discusses what factors are part of the analysis 
to find an employee an “outside employee.”
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for the interpretation of state minimum wage and overtime statutes, it 
is likely that the findings in Christopher will apply in this state, even 
if Massachusetts’s PSRs bring suit against their employers under 
section 1A of chapter 151 of the General Laws of Massachusetts.
E. Texas and Florida
Because Texas and Florida do not have state overtime 
statutes, the only possible option for employees seeking recovery of 
overtime wages is FLSA.  Christopher establishes the binding 
precedent that pharmaceutical salesmen are exempt under FLSA, 
thus it is unlikely that such a case will ever be brought before any 
court—unless the facts vary significantly (this is unlikely as, overall, 
detailers in the industry have been engaging in the same types of 
duties for the past seven decades).
F. Illinois
Illinois’s overtime statute comes with an extensive 
description of excluded employees, which includes employees who 
serve in a “bona fide executive, administrative or professional 
capacity,” as defined by FLSA.182 Notably, “outside salesmen” are 
excluded separately from the “white-collar” exemptions, and are 
defined as “an employee regularly engaged in making sales or 
obtaining orders or contracts for services where a major portion of 
such duties are performed away from his employer’s place of 
business.” 183 As with the federal law, this is also a qualitative 
standard.184 The state’s appellate court applied such a standard in 
DeWig v. Landshire, Inc., a case in which the court was charged with 
determining whether a “route salesman”—who delivered his 
employer’s “sandwiches and delicatessen foods to convenience 
stores, schools and other outlets” in Sandwich, Illinois—was an 
182 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/4 (West 2004).
183 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/3 (West) (effective Jan. 1, 2009).
184 In fact, even the dissent in DeWig v. Landshire, Inc., 666 N.E.2d 1204, 
1208 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (Breslin, J., dissenting) (citation omitted), acknowledged 
that “the state definition of outside salesman should be read in a manner consistent 
with the federal definition.”
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“outside salesman.” 185 As in Christopher, the essential 
determination was whether the employee’s employment activities 
required him to “regularly engage[] in making sales.”186 The court 
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the Illinois General Assembly’s 
intended for a liberal construction of the text, stating that the statute 
was clear and “unless otherwise defined, words used in the statute are 
to be given their plain, ordinary meaning.”187 For PSRs in Illinois 
hoping to be exempt from the statute, DeWig makes it clear that at 
least some jurisdictions in Illinois are required to strictly construe the 
meaning of “making sales” and are not to consider factors such as 
“commission potential or employer control” in applying the 
statute.188 There is no further guidance as there are no reported cases 
of PSRs suing for overtime compensation.
G. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania provides overtime protections for employees 
but expressly excludes those who are employed “in the capacity of 
outside salesm[e]n.”189 There are no reported cases involving PSRs 
suing for overtime compensation.  There is one reported case in 
which the appellate-level Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania190
demonstrated how the overtime exemptions are applied in the 
185 See DeWig, 666 N.E.2d at 1205 (making the mixed factual and legal 
finding that the “route salesman” included selling among his primary duties and 
thus qualified for the “outside salesman” exemption).
186 Id. at 1206 (internal quotation marks omitted).
187 Id. (citing Granite City Div. of Nat’l Steel Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control 
Bd., 613 N.E.2d 719, 733 (Ill. 1993)).
188 Id. This decision was made in Third District of Illinois Appellate 
Court.  “A decision of the appellate court . . . [is] not binding on other appellate 
districts” in the state of Illinois.  State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Yapejian, 605 
N.E.2d 539, 542 (Ill. 1992).
189 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 333.105(a)(5) (West) (effective Oct. 3, 
2012) (the exemptions); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 333.104 (West) (effective July 
5, 2012) (the overtime statute).
190 The Commonwealth Court “is unique to Pennsylvania . . . [and] one of 
Pennsylvania's two statewide intermediate appellate courts.”  Learn, UNIFIED JUD.
SYS. PA., http://www.pacourts.us/learn (last updated Sept. 2013).  The court is 
differentiated from the state’s appellate-level “superior court,” and is “primarily 
responsible for matters involving state and local governments and regulatory 
agencies.”  Id.
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state,191 but it offers very little guidance in the way of how PSRs 
would fare in Pennsylvania’s courts.  Nonetheless, the case serves as 
a fine example for comparison between state and federal 
administrative law.
In Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industry,
the court laid out the rules of agency interpretation for the state.192
The court stated that “the FLSA does not . . . pre-empt state 
regulation of wages and overtime if the state’s standards are more 
beneficial to workers.”193 Moreover, the Minimum Wage Act of 
Pennsylvania “grant[ed] the Department [of Labor and Industry] 
broad powers” to protect employees, 194 and delegated to 
Pennsylvania’s Secretary of Labor the authority to “promulgate 
regulations relative to overtime” under section 333.104(c). 195
“When . . . construed liberally, [the statute] confers in the 
Department either legislative or interpretative rulemaking power.”196
Finally, the agency’s “interpretation is entitled to great deference and 
is to be given controlling weight” unless found “clearly 
erroneous.” 197 This mirrors its federal counterpart’s grant of 
authority to the Secretary of Labor to enforce and interpret FLSA as 
the agency sees fit.
The opinion also examined the differences between “rules 
adopted under administrative agencies' legislative rulemaking power 
191 See Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 958 A.2d 1050 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2008), aff'd, 8 A.3d 866 (Pa. 2010) (upholding the state Secretary of 
Labor’s “domestic services” regulation as valid). 
192 Id. at 1059.
193 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Manliguez v. Joseph, 226 F. Supp. 
2d 377, 388 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Congress 
exercised its Commerce Power in legislating FLSA and pursuant to that power, 
made FLSA valid in all states.  Lisa M. Milani, The Applicability of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to Volunteer Workers at Nonprofit Organizations, 43 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 233, 233 n.1 (1986), available at 
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2849&context=
wlulr.  The statute explicitly allows for stricter state laws to survive conflict 
preemption as to provide greater protections for employees.
194 Bayada Nurses, Inc., 958 A.2d at 1057.
195 Id. at 1056; 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 333.104(c) (West) (effective 
July 5, 2012).
196 Bayada Nurses, Inc., 958 A.2d at 1057.
197 Id. at 1057–58 (citing Riverwalk Casino, L.P. v. Pa. Gaming Control 
Bd., 926 A.2d 926 (2007)).
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and their interpretative rulemaking power.  The former, known as 
substantive rules or regulations, result from legislative power granted 
by the legislature . . . .”198 Substantive rules are presumed to be 
reasonable and have the force of law, as long as they are 
“reasonable” and constitutional.199 Interpretive rules and regulations 
construe statutes and are deferred to as long as they are “reasonable” 
and do not expand upon the underlying statute’s terms and 
purpose.200 While this does not directly help an analysis of whether 
PSRs may or may not be exempt, it is interesting to see how 
administrative laws at the state and federal levels mirror one another, 
and how each give substantial deference to the respective 
administrative agencies that are charged with enforcing the law.  
With this knowledge, PSRs (and other exempt employees) are able to 
seek greater protections at the state level if they are able to garner 
support from the state legislature or the state’s equivalent to the DOL, 
which are charged with enforcing and interpreting the statutes.  
Thanks to Congress’s express language in the FLSA, they can do this 
with the assurance that federal law will not override any expanded 
protections.
While placing the spotlight on eight important states in the 
pharmaceutical industry provides but a limited sample, the sample 
effectively represents the current outlook throughout the United 
States, as demonstrated by my research of the overtime statutes in the 
fifty states.201 The research shows that at least fifteen states have 
expressly adopted the FLSA’s exemptions as their state law 
exemptions or have written provisions that are as exclusive in scope 
as the FLSA.202 There are some states that appear to favor employers 
more, such as the nineteen or so states that do not have overtime 
statutes, which means that, in those states, employees have only the 
FLSA or contractual agreements as a recourse for obtaining overtime 
wages. 203 There are about nineteen or more states that are like 
California, New York, or Pennsylvania, which do have overtime 
198 Id. at 1056–57. 
199 Id.
200 Id. at 1057.
201 See infra Appendix.
202 See id.
203 See id.
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statutes but also exclude “outside salesmen.”204 In those states, PSRs 
will need to fight the same court battles as Christopher and Buchanan 
did, with the exception of citing a state statute rather than the FLSA 
as their legal authority.  This is also true for PSRs working in states 
like Alabama and North Carolina, where the state legislatures have 
provided overtime statutes but no exclusions.205 It is difficult to say 
whether Christopher has impacted the opportunities for success in 
the former category of states.  As their exemptions are coextensive to, 
or adopted from, the FLSA, it is perhaps quite persuasive for 
employers to argue that PSRs should be considered exempt under the 
state statute because they were found exempt under the federal 
standard.  On the other hand, judging from the fairly equal divisions 
in jurisdictions, it is clear that federal law and policy do not 
necessarily dictate what goes on within state legislative and 
administrative chambers.  In a great number of cases, it will be up to 
the courts to decide whether or not Christopher is persuasive in 
interpreting state law.
However, there is one category where it is safe to say that the 
PSRs—whose territories are located in the nineteen states that never 
had overtime statutes to begin with—are negatively impacted by 
Christopher.  Whereas PSRs in these states could once argue under 
the FLSA (as the plaintiff in In re Novartis did successfully), they are 
now excluded by the precedent that Christopher has established.  
Perhaps PSRs have effectively lost all hope in obtaining overtime 
compensation in these states.
VI. CONCLUSION
This note has discussed how the Supreme Court arrived at its 
decision in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.  It was a 
decision that the Court made through careful consideration of 
whether the DOL’s interpretation of a statute the DOL was charged 
with enforcing and defining was entitled to deference; whether the 
seventy-decade-long practices of the pharmaceutical industry would 
be justified by a change in the law; and, finally, whether the FLSA’s 
purposes would best be served by its decision. Whether one agrees 
with the outcome or not, the law was carried out according to the 
204 See id.
205 See id.
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administrative law promulgation and review procedures that the 
federal system of checks and balances operate upon.
What is in store for PSRs in the future given the Court’s 
decision in Christopher?  As this note suggests, many PSRs across 
the nation will still have the opportunity to at least argue their cases 
under their respective state laws.  Perhaps they will succeed based 
upon the same reasoning that Christopher, Buchanan, and the DOL 
used before the U.S. Supreme Court.  Maybe a sympathetic court
analyzing a similar set of facts under state law will reach a different 
outcome.  Or perhaps the facts of these new plaintiff-PSRs will differ 
according to the varying nature of their duties.  This is certainly 
possible as technology is constantly improving and changing the face 
of industry.  Perhaps the work of detailers will evolve with 
technology and social practices. Would a PSR still be considered an 
“outside employee” under the FLSA if he or she telecommunicates 
with physicians—from a permanent desk at the pharmaceutical 
employer’s office—and sends free samples, gifts, and other 
“promotional goods” through the Internet?  Probably not.  In the 
short term, what is more likely to happen is that pharmaceutical 
companies will come up with creative ways of changing the work 
descriptions for PSRs around the nation, fitting them squarely into 
other exemptions or unambiguously within the “outside sales 
employee” exemption.





State provision exempting "outside salesman"
AL None None
AK Yes ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 23.10.055(9)(B)(3) (West 
2013)—coextensive
AZ Yes None
AR Yes ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-211(D) (West 2007)—
coextensive
CA Yes CAL. LAB. CODE § 1171 (West 2001)
CO Yes None
CT Yes CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-58 (West 2013)—
coextensive
DE No None
DC Yes D.C. CODE § 32-1004 (West 2012)—coextensive
FL No None
GA No None
HI Yes HAW. CODE R. § 12-21-6 (West 2013)
ID Yes IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-1504(3) (West 2013)—
coextensive
IL Yes 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/3 (West 
2009)—coextensive
IN Yes IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-2-3 (West 2013)
IA No None
KS Yes KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1202(e)(3) (West 
2013)—coextensive
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MO Yes Coextensive
MT Yes Coextensive
NE Yes Coextensive, adopts FLSA
NV Yes NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 608.250 (West 2011)—





NY Yes N.Y. LAB. LAW § 651 (McKinney 2010)
NC Yes None
ND Yes N.D. ADMIN. CODE 46-02-07-02 (2013), but 
work unrelated to outside sales may not be over 
20% of hours
OH Yes Coextensive
OK Yes Coextensive, adopts FLSA
OR Yes OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.020 (West 2013)—
coextensive
PA Yes 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 333.105 (West 2012) —as 
defined by the Secretary
RI Yes None





VT Yes VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 383 (West 2013)—





WI Yes WIS. ADMIN. CODE DWD § 274.04 (2013)—
outside sales are employees spend 80% time 
away from employer
WY No None
